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Recent empirical studies show that the Chinese currency renminbi is either becoming
or has become a dominant reference currency in Asia. However, the high correlation
between the US dollar and renminbi movements hampers the identi¯cation of their
individual e®ects on the Asian currencies. In particular, the application of Frankel–
Wei regressions to determine the weights of the US dollar and the (unorthogonalized)
renminbi in the implicit currency baskets could su®er from endogeneity problems
that produce an upward bias in renminbi's estimated weight. This paper reviews the
evidence by applying country-speci¯c Vector Autoregression (VAR) models to daily
exchange rate data from nine Asian economies namely, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. The VAR
methodology allows for mutual interaction of the exchange rate variables, thereby
circumventing the simultaneity bias problem. To overcome the identi¯cation prob-
lem, we study the relationship between Asian currencies and the US dollar (ren-
minbi) in terms of their bilateral rates against the renminbi (US dollar). All bilateral
exchange rates are standardized so that the impulse responses generated are in terms
of the number of standard deviations of each series, hence facilitating comparisons
across the two sets of models. Generalized impulse response analysis reveals that the
US dollar has a signi¯cant in°uence on Asian currencies before the global ¯nancial
crisis but its impact has weakened post-crisis. By contrast, there is clear evidence
that the role of the renminbi in Asian exchange rate determination has increased
after the global ¯nancial crisis, exerting either greater or a similar impact as the US
dollar. Nonetheless, our ¯ndings do not support the claim that a de facto \renminbi
bloc" has emerged in the region.
Keywords: Currency baskets; renminbi; US dollar; vector autoregressions.
1. Introduction
The economic rise of China has led to the question of whether exchange rate
management in the Asian economies has shifted course to pay less attention
to the US dollar and more attention to the renminbi as a key reference
currency. After all, China has become the world's second largest economy as
well as the largest exporter of goods in the world. Indeed, China is already one
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of the top (if not the most important) trading partners for most Asian
economies. Intra-regional trade has tripled since 2000 and regional produc-
tion networks have spread rapidly with China playing the role of an assembly
hub for ¯nal goods. The Asian economies not only need to retain external
competitiveness relative to China but also to maintain exchange rate stability
with respect to the renminbi in light of their strengthening trade, investment,
and ¯nancial linkages with China. Hence, it is advantageous for the Asian
currencies to exhibit greater co-movement with the renminbi, which will
increase the latter's dominance as a reference currency.
Most Asian countries have adopted a de facto basket peg system as their
exchange rate regime, re°ecting the open nature of their economies as well as
their geographically diversi¯ed trade patterns. The monetary authorities in
these countries manage their exchange rates by soft pegging towards a broad
basket of currencies which typically comprises the currencies of major trading
partners and competitors (Williamson, 2005). In this way, domestic ¯rms can
have a more stable trading environment as well as retain their cost-com-
petitiveness. Under this regime, the weights assigned to the component
currencies are usually not disclosed to the public. Frankel and Wei (1994)
developed a method for uncovering the weights assigned to the major inter-
national currencies such as the US dollar, the German mark and the yen
constituting the currency basket. These weights capture the combined e®ect
of the respective major international currency's direct impact on the Asian
currency and its indirect impact through the regional currencies.
Many studies applied the Frankel–Wei type regression to the Asian
countries to determine the regional in°uences of world major currencies.1 The
region was found to be on a soft dollar peg before the 1997 Asian currency
crisis, as the weight on the US dollar turned out to be close to one while those
for the German mark and the yen were small and statistically insigni¯cant in
the pre-Asian crisis period. Although the exchange rates in the region
exhibited greater °exibility during the Asian crisis, the US dollar was found
to be still heavily weighted in the currency baskets after the crisis (McKin-
non, 2000). Consequently, the region was characterized as being an \East
Asian dollar standard" whereby the US dollar served as an anchor for ex-
change rate polices in the region. However, various studies including Kearney
1Some studies apply extensions to the Frankel–Wei method such as rolling regressions that
allow for structural breaks in the data, adding lags to the explanatory variables to cater for
dynamic e®ects and modeling heteroskedastic error terms with GARCH processes. There are
also other studies that employ di®erent empirical methods for instance cointegration analysis,
Markov switching techniques and structural VAR models to study currency relationships in
the region.
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and Muckley (2007) found a notable yen in°uence despite the absence of a
\yen bloc" in the region.
More recently, there is a growing literature that applies the Frankel–Wei
type or other methodology to determine the extent which the renminbi
in°uences exchange rate determination in the region. With few exceptions,2
most studies found the renminbi gaining in°uence over time. For instance,
Chen et al. (2009) and Ito (2010) found °uctuations in the renminbi that are
orthogonal to US dollar movements exert a substantial impact on exchange
rate movements in Asia. Meanwhile, Fratzscher and Mehl (2011) constructed
a regional factor that is highly important in explaining Asian currency
movements and showed the renminbi Granger causes or has predictive con-
tent on this factor. In fact, several studies found the in°uence of the renminbi
has surpassed that of the US dollar for some Asian currencies. Speci¯cally,
Cavoli and Rajan (2010) found several Asian currencies exhibited greater
stability against the renminbi compared to the US dollar. Both Henning
(2012) and Subramanian and Kessler (2013) used non-orthogonalized ren-
minbi movements in Frankel–Wei regressions to show that the renminbi is
already a dominant reference currency in Asia, suggesting the possibility that
a de facto \renminbi bloc" has emerged.
Granted that China's growing economic dominance could very well lend
impetus to regional economies to benchmark their currencies towards the
renminbi, it is not clear that renminbi has overtaken the US dollar as the
dominant reference currency of the region. After all, China's capital account
remains largely closed and the renminbi is not yet fully convertible. Not-
withstanding the pro-active steps taken by Chinese authorities to liberalize
the capital account and internationalize the renminbi, foreign trade and ¯-
nancial transactions in the region continue to be denominated or invoiced
mainly in the US dollar. Moreover, Asian economies hold their foreign
reserves largely in US dollars and it is thus advantageous for them to
benchmark their exchange rate towards the US dollar in order to have more
stability in terms of domestic purchasing power. In sum, the US dollar still
enjoys incumbency advantages and network e®ects as the pre-eminent
international currency so that it is likely to retain some level of in°uence on
exchange rates in Asia.
2For instance, Balasubramaniam et al. (2011) found, after allowing for structural changes in
the data, that the renminbi °uctuations that are orthogonal to US dollar movements play only
a limited role in the exchange rate polices of East Asian economies. Meanwhile, Girardin
(2011) found the central banks in the region are benchmarking their currencies against a
broader range of Asian currencies instead of a single regional reference currency.
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The purpose of this paper is to review the empirical evidence on the role
played by the renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar in regional exchange rate
determination. Such a re-examination is necessary in view of the problems
and pitfalls associated with the application of the Frankel–Wei methodology
in determining the weights of US dollar and the renminbi in the implicit
currency baskets. The high collinearity between the renminbi and the US
dollar led many preceding research to use only the part of renminbi °uc-
tuations that are orthogonal to US dollar movements. However, this results
in biased currency weight estimates and consequently, several other studies
use non-orthogonalized renminbi °uctuations. However, such regressions will
su®er from multicollinearity leading to imprecise estimates of the currency
weights. Further, the renminbi variable is likely to be endogenous in the
majority of Frankel–Wei regressions re°ecting the common regional shocks
that Asian currencies and the renminbi are subjected to. In these cases, the
Frankel–Wei regressions su®er from simultaneity bias problems resulting in
invalid statistical inference on the currency weights.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an alternative method to
assess the relative regional in°uence of the renminbi vis-a-vis the US dollar on
Asian currencies. First, to overcome the simultaneity bias, we estimate
country-speci¯c Vector Autoregression (VAR) models that allow for endog-
enous interactions among all the exchange rate variables. The impact which
reference currencies have on Asian currencies can then be assessed through
generalized impulse response analysis. Second, to overcome the identi¯cation
problem, we estimate two sets of VAR models. The ¯rst set studies the
relationship between Asian currencies and the US dollar using their bilateral
rates against the renminbi, while the second set examines the relationship
between the Asian currencies and the renminbi using their bilateral rates
against the US dollar. Since the two sets of models use bilateral exchange
rates against two di®erent currencies, the impulse responses they produce are
in general not comparable. To facilitate comparisons across the two sets of
models, all bilateral exchange rates are standardized so that the impulse
responses generated are in terms of the number of standard deviations of
each series.
The VAR models are applied to daily exchange rate data of the following
nine countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Korea, Malaysia, the Phi-
lippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. There are two sample periods one
before and the other after the global ¯nancial crisis which allows us to in-
vestigate how exchange rate dynamics have changed after the crisis. To pre-
empt the results, we found the US dollar has a dominant impact on regional
currencies movements before the global ¯nancial crisis but that this in°uence
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has weakened post-crisis. By contrast, there is clear evidence that the role
of renminbi in Asian exchange rate determination has increased after the
global ¯nancial crisis. With few exceptions, the renminbi either has the same
or a more dominant impact than the US dollar on the Asian currencies
movements.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a review of the
potential problems that arise in the application of the Frankel–Wei meth-
odology to determine the weight of renminbi in the implicit currency baskets.
In Sec. 3, we use Asian bilateral exchange rate data to estimate the two sets of
VAR models and the ¯ndings from generalized impulse analysis, along with
pre-versus post-crisis comparisons, are discussed. Section 4 concludes.
2. Problems with the Application of Frankel–Wei Regressions
Frankel and Wei (1994) developed and popularized a method for estimating
the implicit weights assigned to major international currencies in a currency
basket. In particular, they employ the following regression:
eit ¼  þ USDeUSDt þ EUReEURt þ YENeJPYt þ "t; ð1Þ
where the e terms denote the value of each currency in terms of the Swiss
franc which is the numeraire of choice, and the ¯rst di®erence of the log
exchange rate is given byet ¼ et  et1. The superscripts i, USD, EUR, and
YEN denote an Asian currency, the US dollar, Germany mark, and Japanese
yen respectively. In this regression, the  coe±cients are considered to rep-
resent the weights of the respective reference currencies in the basket. As
discussed in the previous section, this method is widely used in the literature.
More recently, in order to examine the in°uence of renminbi movements on
exchanges rates in the region, a number of studies have extended the Fran-
kel–Wei methodology with a renminbi term included explicitly in the speci-
¯cation of the model as follows3:
eit ¼  þ USDeUSDt þ EUReEURt þ YENeYENt þ RMBeRMBt þ "t:
ð2Þ
In other words, the home currency now has the renminbi added as a reference
currency in its implicit currency basket.
However, we note that empirical investigations into the in°uence of ren-
minbi are hampered by China's ¯xed exchange rate system in certain time
3In this and some other studies, the German mark was replaced by its successor, the euro
which is the European Union's single currency.
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periods which renders the renminbi variations as practically indistinguishable
from US dollar movements during those periods.4 China abandoned its peg to
the US dollar and announced a shift in its exchange rate regime to a basket
peg in mid-2005. In October 2008, the renminbi was re-pegged to the US
dollar at 6.83RMB per dollar in response to the outbreak of the global ¯-
nancial crisis. Since June 2010, the renminbi has returned to a managed °oat
against a basket of currencies. There are thus two periods where the renminbi
was somewhat decoupled from the US dollar which could be used to unveil
the relative impact of these two currencies on exchange rate movements in
the region. Hence, to overcome the identi¯cation problem, the empirical
analysis is carried out over two sample periods from 1 August 2005 to 30
August 2008 and from 1 June 2010 to 9 April 2014. In view of possible
structural breaks related to the global ¯nancial crisis, we perform our esti-
mation of these two periods separately. In this way, we can compare how
exchange rate dynamics in the region might have changed between the pre-
and post-crisis periods and determine whether the in°uence of renminbi has
altered after the crisis.
Nonetheless, restricting the sample periods to such short time durations
means employing higher frequency data in the analysis. As in most related
studies, we use daily nominal exchange rate series.5 Degrees of freedom
consideration arising from the shortness of each time period means lower
frequency data such as monthly time series have to be eschewed. This imposes
a constraint on applying the modi¯ed equation by Frankel and Wei (2008)
that includes in Eq. (1) a term to capture exchange market pressure. This
additional variable takes into account °exibility of the currency but its
computation requires data on reserves which are available only at a lower
frequency on a monthly basis. In any case, this paper is interested in unco-
vering unconditional correlations across regional currency movements re-
gardless of whether they are the result of market forces or government
interventions in the foreign exchange markets. Hence, it may not be as critical
to estimate the currency weights conditioned on exchange market pressure.
Despite the switch in the Chinese exchange rate regime, the correlation
coe±cient between the renminbi and the US dollar movements remains very
high in both sample periods. The correlation coe±cients between the bilateral
rates of the reniminbi and the US dollar against the euro are 0.93 and 0.79
before and after the crisis respectively. Such high collinearity between the
4A plot of the bilateral exchange rate between the renminbi and the US dollar can be found in
Fig. 1.
5We note this is not inconsistent with the high frequency monitoring of exchange rates by
central banks in the region.
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variables could lead to multicollinearity problems in the estimation of Eq. (2)
so that it is di±cult to di®erentiate between the US dollar and the renminbi
in terms of their individual e®ects on local currency movements. Hence, in
earlier studies an auxillary regression of the renminbi variations against the
US dollar variations is ¯rst performed. Residuals from this auxillary regres-
sion are then used to capture renminbi °uctuations independent of US dollar
movements. Chen et al. (2009) and Ito (2010), amongst others, used such
orthogonalized movements of renminbi as the eRMBt term in Eq. (2).
However, replacing the renminbi variable with residuals from the auxillary
regression in the Frankel–Wei regressions will lead to biased estimation of the
US dollar weight. Using only the part of renminbi movements that is or-
thogonal to US dollar °uctuations basically means that whenever there is
ambiguity in separating the e®ect of the two currencies, the e®ect will be
attributed to the US dollar. This \does not amount to running a clean and
transparent horse race between the di®erent reference currencies. . ." Sub-
ramanian and Kessler (2013, p. 5). Consequently, several papers such as
Henning (2012) and Subramanian and Kessler (2013) estimated Eq. (2) with
non-orthogonalized renminbi °uctuations. They found the weight estimates
associated with the renminbi tend to be higher than those for the US dollar
and concluded that the renminbi is already a dominant reference currency in
the region.
There are nonetheless several potential problems with using the renminbi
variable in the direct application of Frankel–Wei regressions, that is, as the
eRMBt term in Eq. (2). First, the high collinearity between the US dollar and
renminbi variables will typically in°ate the standard errors of their coe±cient
estimates, thereby lowering the precision of the weight estimates. The extent
by which the standard error of a regression coe±cient is in°ated is normally
measured by the variance in°ation factor and depends on the degree of col-
linearity between explanatory variables in the equation. If the standard
errors are signi¯cantly in°ated as would be the case of severe multi-
collinearity, the greater imprecision of the weight estimates will throw doubts
on the inference regarding the regional in°uence of the US dollar and the
renminbi.
Second and more importantly, the likely endogeneity of the renminbi
variable could pose problems to the estimation of the Frankel–Wei regres-
sions which invalidates the conclusions drawn on its relative regional in°u-
ence of the renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar. As a regional currency, it is
plausible that °uctuations in the renminbi are themselves a®ected by
movements in the other Asian currencies. For instance, when the renminbi
and the home currency are hit by common shocks say from outside the region,
Is the Renminbi Asia's Dominant Reference Currency?
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the correlation between these two variables will increase and the weight of the
renminbi in the implicit currency basket will tend to be large. Indeed, the
large renminbi weight estimates obtained in the more recent studies may well
be the result of overestimation caused by the lack of exogeneity in the ren-
minbi variable. When an explanatory variable is simultaneously determined
with the dependent variable, we end up with biased and inconsistent esti-
mates of its coe±cient. In this case, the statistical inferences on currency
weights are no longer valid.
3. An Alternative Model of Exchange Rate Dynamics
In order to determine the relative importance of the US dollar and the
renminbi to the Asian currencies, we need to be able to distinguish between
the e®ects of their individual movements. However, the high correlation
between the US dollar and the renminbi hampers the isolation of their
partial e®ects on the Asian currencies. To overcome this identi¯cation
problem, we ¯rst study the relationship between each Asian currency and
the US dollar in terms of their bilateral rates against the renminbi. Such an
analysis will allow us to assess the impact of the US dollar on the Asian
currency but we cannot estimate the in°uence of the renminbi on the
Asian currency for such a model. The analysis is then repeated between each
Asian currency and the renminbi in terms of their bilateral rates against the
US dollar. Conversely, the second analysis allows us to assess the impact of
the renminbi but not the impact of the US dollar on the Asian currency. To
facilitate comparisons across the two sets of models, we standardized the
bilateral rates so that all exchange rate series have a standard deviation that
is equal to one.
The exchange rate variables used in our analysis is expressed as the
amount of domestic currency that can be bought by either a renminbi or a US
dollar. Given the way the exchange rate is de¯ned, an increase in e denotes a
depreciation of that currency against the reference currency. As mentioned
earlier, we de¯ne the pre- and post-crisis periods as 1 August 2005 to 30
August 2008 and from 1 June 2010 to 9 April 2014 respectively. Figure 1
depicts the plots of the daily bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar
(USD) since 1 August 2010 ¯rst for the following currencies, Chinese Ren-
minbi (CNY), Euro (EUR), Japanese Yen (JPY), Indonesian Rupiah (IDR),
Indian Rupee (INR), Korean Won (KRW), Malaysian ringgit (MYR), Phi-
lippine peso (PHP), Singapore dollar (SGD), Thai Baht (THB), and the
Taiwan Dollar (TWD). The shaded area in each chart marks the period when
the renminbi was re-pegged to the US dollar due to the global ¯nancial crisis.
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The time periods before and after corresponds to the pre- and post-crisis
sample periods respectively in our empirical study.
We use a VAR model to estimate the relationships among the exchange
rates series, in view of the endogeneity particularly among the Asian home
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Fig. 1. Bilateral exchange rates against US dollar (3 August 2005 to 4 April 2014).
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currency and the other regional currencies such as the yen or the renminbi.
Such models allowing for mutual interaction of the variables thereby cir-
cumvent the simultaneity bias problem present in single equation models. We
run the following country-speci¯c VAR model for each of the nine Asian
currency:
et ¼ 0 þ
Xp
k¼1
kðLÞetk þ "t; ð3Þ
where et ¼ ðeusd=rmb;t;eeur=rmb;t;ejpy=rmb;t;ei=rmb;tÞ0 i.e. the bilateral
rates against the renminbi in the ¯rst set of VAR models while in the second
set of VAR models, we use the bilateral rates against the US dollar
et ¼ ðermb=usd;t;eeur=usd;t;ejpy=usd;t;ei=usd;tÞ0; kðLÞ is a 4 4 matrix of
lag polynomials, and 0 is vector of constants. We employ a VAR model in
di®erences instead of levels due to the non-stationarity of the exchange rate
series. The results of Phillip–Perron unit root tests (Phillips and Perron,
1988) as recorded in Table 1 show that all the exchange rate data series used
in this study are integrated of order one at least at the 5% signi¯cance level.
The only exception is the Thai baht which appears stationary during the
post-crisis period unless we use a 1% signi¯cance level. Thus, we model the
¯rst di®erences of the log exchange rate series.
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Fig. 1. (Continued)
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The ¯tting of a VAR model typically requires the estimation of many
highly collinear parameters so that it is di±cult to recover the weights or 
coe±cients from Eq. (3). It is usual in the VAR framework to assess the
impact of innovations in the variables through impulse response analysis
instead. We derive impulse response functions to trace the dynamic e®ects of
innovations in the US dollar (the renminbi) on the domestic currency in the
¯rst (second) set of VAR models. In particular, generalized impulse responses
are used since they do not depend on a particular causal ordering of the
variables. In other words, we examine the responses of local currency to
unanticipated US dollar or renminbi depreciation.6 We note a one standard
deviation shock to the USD/RMB bilateral rate is the same as that for RMB/
6For simplicity, we do not incorporate asymmetric e®ects of reference currencies on Asian
currencies even though Pontines and Serigar (2010) found some asymmetric in°uences in
terms of an aversion to an appreciation of the renminbi in the case of the Philippine peso and
Thai baht.
Table 1. Phillip–Perron unit root tests (p-values).
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Levels First di®erences Levels First di®erences
(a) Bilateral rates against renminbi
EUR 0.40 0.00 0.42 0.00
HKD 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
IDR 0.87 0.00 0.97 0.00
INR 0.95 0.00 0.85 0.00
KRW 0.28 0.00 0.96 0.00
MYR 0.99 0.00 0.13 0.00
PHP 0.91 0.00 0.75 0.00
SGD 0.58 0.00 0.73 0.00
THB 0.54 0.00 0.20 0.00
TWD 0.60 0.00 0.82 0.00
USD 0.86 0.00 0.71 0.00
(b) Bilateral rates against US dollar
CNY 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
EUR 0.81 0.00 0.09 0.00
HKD 0.35 0.00 0.06 0.00
IDR 0.19 0.00 0.98 0.00
INR 0.79 0.00 0.87 0.00
KRW 0.51 0.00 0.93 0.00
MYR 0.88 0.00 0.09 0.00
PHP 0.62 0.00 0.10 0.00
SGD 0.51 0.00 0.18 0.00
THB 0.85 0.00 0.01 0.00
TWD 0.47 0.00 0.28 0.00
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USD since the variables enter into the model as the ¯rst di®erence in loga-
rithm of the exchange rate. Further, all variables in both sets of VAR models
are standardized to have a variance one so that the magnitude of the impulse
responses re°ect the responses in terms of the number of standard deviations.
This facilitates comparisons of the impulse responses across the two sets of
models that use bilateral rates against di®erent currencies.
In each set of country-speci¯c VAR models, we analyze daily bilateral
rates over the two periods when the renminbi was on a soft peg. As for the
number of lags (p) in the model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
selects an optimal lag lengths of either two and three for countries in the pre-
crisis periods. For the post-crisis period, all countries have an optimal lag
length of one. Figures 2 and 3 depict the responses of the home currency to a
one standard deviation shock in the US dollar (panel a) and the renminbi
(panel b) in the pre- and post-crisis periods respectively. That is, the plots in
panels a and b are obtained from the ¯rst and second set of VAR models
respectively. For ease of comparison, all charts in the two ¯gures except those
for Hong Kong are drawn to the same scale. The generalized impulse
responses are plotted and extended to 7 days, by which time the impulses
have stabilized. We bootstrap 1000 replications of the VAR residuals to
obtain robust standard errors for the impulse responses and construct two
standard deviation bands which are displayed in the ¯gures. As usual, the
impulses are said to be not statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level whenever
the associated band includes the zero line.
It is clear from Fig. 2 that the home currency is more responsive to a US
dollar shock than a renminbi shock in the pre-crisis period. An unanticipated
one-standard deviation shock to the US dollar produces statistically signi¯-
cant impulse responses in all the Asian currencies under consideration. Ex-
cept for Hong Kong, the magnitudes of these responses after a 1 day lag are
similar ranging from 0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations. It is unsurprising that we
obtain a huge response of 0.9 standard deviations in the case of Hong Kong
since the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar. By contrast, an
unanticipated one standard deviation shock to the renminbi produces either
insigni¯cant or marginally signi¯cant impulse responses in the Asian cur-
rencies. We infer that the US dollar shock played a bigger role than the
renminbi in determining movements in the Asian currencies in the period just
before the onset of the global ¯nancial crisis.
Interestingly, the plots in Fig. 3 look rather di®erent. With the sole ex-
ception of Hong Kong, a renminbi shock elicits either a stronger or a similar
level of response from the home currency compared to a US dollar shock in
the post-crisis period. Only in the case of Hong Kong do we see the impact of
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the US dollar shock clearly dominating the renminbi shock which is what is
expected in view of Hong Kong's exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, we
observe even in this case that the impulse response to a renminbi shock is now
statistically signi¯cant. In fact, we obtain signi¯cant responses to a renminbi
shock in all cases, the magnitude after a 1 day lag ranging between 0.1 to 0.2
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Fig. 2. Generalized impulse responses of home currency (pre-crisis).
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standard deviations. In comparison, the US dollar shock produced statisti-
cally insigni¯cant responses in the three cases of India, Korea, and Malaysia.
The other Asian currencies respond by 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations to a US
dollar shock. Overall, although the results point to the US dollar retaining its
in°uence as a reference currency in majority of the cases, its impact appears
to have waned post-crisis.
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Fig. 3. Generalized impulse responses of home currency (post-crisis).
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It is evident from these results that the role of the renminbi in in°uencing
Asian currencies movements has grown across the two time periods. This
suggests that in exchange rate management, the monetary authorities of the
Asian countries may to some extent be benchmarking towards the renminbi
particularly after the global ¯nancial crisis. The growing renminbi in°uence
on regional currencies can be attributed to the strengthening trade ties be-
tween China and the East Asian countries over time. Asia's trade integration
with China has deepened due to the latter's growing role as the hub of
regional trade network through the formation of vertical supply chains. Such
vertical trading chain networks stretches across the East Asian countries
with each specializing in particular stages of production and China playing
the role of an assembly hub for ¯nal goods.7 In addition, trade between the
region and China has accelerated through the establishment of free trade
agreements (FTAs) such as the ASEAN-PRC FTA and the Preferential
Trade Agreement between China and Taiwan. Moreover, trade competition
between the Asian countries versus China has heightened and the impact of
renminbi °uctuations on exports competitiveness of East Asian countries has
climbed steadily over time (Mattoo et al., 2012). It has thus become more
important for East Asian monetary authorities to maintain stability of their
currencies vis-à-vis the renminbi in order to stabilize the trading environ-
ment for the local ¯rms as well as retain their trade competitiveness in third
markets.
Furthermore, China has taken concrete steps aimed at broadening the use
of the renminbi such as allowing companies to settle cross-border trades in
renminbi, as well as easing restrictions to allow o®shore banks to transfer
renminbi among themselves in order to facilitate the issuance of renminbi
denominated ¯nancial products. Of particular signi¯cance are liberalization
measures that allow o®shore banks and central banks to invest in China's
interbank bond market. O®shore money managers are also given greater
latitude in investing in renminbi denominated stocks, bonds, and other
assets. Foreign ¯rms would certainly be more amenable to accepting pay-
ments in renminbi now that the barriers to invest the currency are being
eradicated. As the usage of the renminbi in pricing and settling intra-regional
trade widens, market forces will tend to increase its co-movements with Asian
currencies. In light of these developments, it is not surprising to ¯nd the
renminbi gaining in°uence on Asian currencies.
7IMF (2011) provides a detailed analysis of how trade networks in Asia have evolved. We note
that trade and ¯nancial transactions in the region are still mostly denominated in the US
dollar. Nonetheless, the Chinese authorities have been promoting the use of the renminbi as a
vehicle currency.
Is the Renminbi Asia's Dominant Reference Currency?
1450002-17
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper reviews the empirical evidence that the renminbi has become the
dominant reference currency in Asia by using daily exchange rate data from
nine Asian economies namely, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan. Such a review
is necessary because the application of Frankel–Wei in estimating weights of
the US dollar and the renminbi in the implicit currency baskets, commonly
used in previous studies, is associated with various problems. In particular,
the use of non-orthogonalized renminbi °uctuations could lead to endo-
geneity problems in the regressions, consequently producing invalid infer-
ence. By not explicitly accounting for observed co-movements between the
Asian currencies with the renminbi due to common shocks hitting the sys-
tem, the results tend to be biased towards a substantial renminbi in°uence
on Asian currencies. This throws doubts on the assessment made by some
researchers that a de facto \renminbi bloc" has already emerged in the
region.
First, to overcome the simultaneity bias, we estimate country-speci¯c
VAR models that allow for endogenous interactions among all the exchange
rate variables. The impact which reference currencies have on Asian cur-
rencies can then be assessed through generalized impulse response analysis.
Second, to overcome the identi¯cation problem, we estimate two sets of VAR
models. The ¯rst set studies the relationship between Asian currencies and
the US dollar using their bilateral rates against the renminbi, while the sec-
ond set examines the relationship between the Asian currencies and the
renminbi using their bilateral rates against the US dollar. All bilateral ex-
change rates are standardized so that the impulse responses generated are in
terms of the number of standard deviations of each series, thereby facilitating
comparisons across the two sets of models.
Our ¯ndings from the generalized impulse response analysis reveal that the
US dollar has a signi¯cant regional in°uence before the global ¯nancial crisis,
although this has weakened post-crisis. By contrast, there is clear evidence
that the co-movement between Asian exchange rates and the renminbi has
increased after the global ¯nancial crisis. While the role of the renminbi in
Asian exchange rate determination has increased, the results do not support
the claim that a de facto \renminbi bloc" has already emerged in the region.
Going forward, as China continues to push for internationalization of the
renminbi and the deregulation and opening of its ¯nancial markets, the
renminbi is likely to gain regional currency status.
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